Tshisekedi at the Center of Congo’s Escalating Crisis
- PoliScoop
- 1 day ago
- 3 min read

On February 18th, Kinshasa formally announced the commencement of another ceasefire. The declaration followed several diplomatic engagements in Luanda, where Angolan President João Lourenço decreed that hostilities would cease at midnight. The measure was presented as a constructive step toward de-escalation and a potential intra-Congolese dialogue.
However, subsequent developments on the ground have generated significant scrutiny regarding the coherence between stated commitments and operational realities.
Military Operations Before and Following the Ceasefire Declaration
Since January 29, 2026, battalions of the FARDC — the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo — in coordination with the FDNB (Burundian Armed Forces), the genocidaires FDLR, Wazalendo militias, and foreign mercenaries, have conducted sustained operations across eastern DRC. These operations have included the use of combat drones and aerial bombardments affecting densely populated areas.
Localities including Rwitsankuku, Bichumbi, Mutunda, Rugezi, Gakenke, Rubemba and others have been cited in reports of hostilities.
Particularly notable is that on February 18 — the date designated for the ceasefire to take effect — coalition forces reportedly carried out extensive attacks across Minembwe and surrounding villages. Fires were reported in Karongi and Kalingi, with casualties documented in Ilundu and adjacent areas.
The proximity of intensified operations to the ceasefire’s implementation has inevitably raised questions regarding the execution and monitoring of the agreement. A ceasefire’s credibility depends not only on its announcement, but on its demonstrable enforcement.
Reported Civilian Impact
On February 19, 2026, the AFC-M23 issued a statement expressing concern over systematic attacks against civilian populations in Minembwe, Mikenge, Karingi, and across the Hauts Plateaux of South Kivu. The statement characterized the situation as involving repeated violations of International Humanitarian Law and criticized the insufficient international response.
Subsequent dates saw further reported violations:
February 20:Â drone strikes and ground offensives in Minembwe and surrounding areas.
February 22:Â between 04:30 and 16:45, coalition forces including FARDC, terrorists FDLR, and Wazalendo militias conducted attacks using combat drones and heavy artillery in Gatoyi, Gasheke, Murema, Mberwa, Ruki, Mutobo and nearby localities. At 10:00, elements reinforced by the Burundi National Defense Force and foreign mercenaries attacked Nyaruhinga in Minembwe, resulting in casualties and displacement.
February 23, at 01:45 a.m.: bombardment in Rumbishi reportedly resulted in the death of Safi Semakoma and injuries to Dieme Mudahakana and Muhawe Evariste, who were admitted to a nearby hospital. On that same day at 4:30 GMT, RFI’s Journal Afrique reported that offensives supported by Burundian forces targeted inhabited areas and caused civilian casualties.
February 24, at 2:43 a.m.:Â drone strikes were reported in Rubaya, followed at 06:00 by attacks in densely populated areas of central Minembwe.
Such incidents would constitute serious breaches of international humanitarian norms. The recurrence of hostilities immediately following a declared ceasefire intensifies scrutiny of enforcement mechanisms and command responsibility.
Rubaya and the Strategic Minerals Framework
The situation in Rubaya introduces a broader geopolitical dimension. On February 5 in Washington, the Democratic Republic of Congo included the Rubaya coltan mine — one of the world’s most significant tantalum deposits — on a shortlist of strategic assets proposed within a minerals cooperation framework with the United States, agreed in December.
Rubaya, located in North Kivu, contains several thousand metric tons of coltan with tantalum concentrations of 20–40% and accounts for approximately 15% of global coltan output. Government estimates suggest that between $50 million and $150 million would be required to restore and expand commercial production.
However, Rubaya remains under AFC-M23. This discrepancy between diplomatic commitments and territorial realities presents a challenge for the DRC government. Offering a high-value asset within an international partnership framework while lacking effective control over the site introduces questions of feasibility and timing — particularly when military operations by the same government intensifies in the same area shortly thereafter.
The Accountability Imperative
At the center of these developments is President Tshisekedi. His administration announced the February 18 ceasefire. The FARDC constitutes the primary force within the coalition conducting ongoing operations. His government advanced the strategic minerals framework in Washington. His second and final constitutional term is scheduled to conclude in 2028.
In such circumstances, coherence between diplomatic declarations, military conduct, and strategic policy becomes paramount. Strategic economic agreements require alignment with territorial realities. Ultimately, the convergence of ceasefire commitments, regional and mercenary military integration, civilian protection concerns, and mineral diplomacy places the burden of clarity and accountability squarely at the level of national leadership.
The direction this crisis takes — toward stabilization or further escalation — depends on decisions made in Kinshasa.